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ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION-A NEW LEGAL STANDARD FOR ITS
UsE-Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982).
In many situations, federal agencies are statutorily permitted to make
policy by either adjudication or rulemaking. ' It is not always clear, how-
ever, when agencies must use one procedure rather than the other. Al-
though courts have traditionally refused to specify situations in which an
agency must use rulemaking or adjudication, 2 a change away from this
judicial deference toward agency discretion may now be occurring.
In Ford Motor Co. v. FTC,3 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals estab-
lished guidelines for when rulemaking alone must be used. Ford involved
an appeal from a prior Federal Trade Commission finding that an automo-
bile dealer, Francis Ford, Inc., had violated section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission (FI'C) Act4 by failing to refund to defaulting consumers sur-
pluses gained upon resale of repossessed cars. Such refunds are required
by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), section 9-504.5 Although
important substantive questions were at issue on appeal, 6 the court re-
fused to reach the merits of the case and dismissed it on procedural
I. Agencies use rulemaking and adjudication to formulate legislative-type rules, and to secure
compliance with existing rules and regulations. The general procedures for both rulemaking and adju-
dication are set out in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976). Rather
than limiting agencies to one of the two available procedures, Congress often provides agencies with
the power to use either. See, e.g., Federal Communication Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976); Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 47, 57a (1976); Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 156, 160 (1976); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 655, 659 (1976).
2. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947);
Florida Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 617 F.2d 809, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1980); NLRB v. St. Francis
Hospital, 601 F.2d 404, 414 (9th Cir. 1979); Colby-Bates-Bowdoin Educ. Telecasting Corp. v.
FCC, 574 F.2d 639, 643 (Ist Cir. 1978); Arkansas-Best Freight Syss., Inc. v. OSHRC, 529 F.2d
649, 656 (8th Cir. 1976).
3. 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1976), which provides that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce... are declared unlawful."
5. In Oregon, where this action originated, U.C.C. § 9-504 has been enacted as OR. REv. STAT. §
79.5040 (1981). Both U.C.C. § 9-504 and OR. REv. STAT. § 79.5040 (1981) provide in relevant part:
(I) A secured party after default may ... dispose of any or all of the collateral in its then
condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing .... The pro-
ceeds of disposition shall be applied in the order following to (a) the reasonable expenses of
retaking, holding, preparing for sale or lease, selling, leasing and the like... (b) the satisfaction
of indebtedness secured by the security interest ....
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account to the
debtor for any surplus ....
6. The primary substantive issue presented to the court involved the delineation of items that
could be included among the reasonable expenses deductible from resale proceeds under U.C.C. § 9-
504. See infra note 39.
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grounds, ruling that the agency had abused its discretion by relying on
adjudication. Such an abuse occurs, the Ford court held, when an agency
uses adjudication to change existing law and to establish rules of wide-
spread application.7
This Note examines prior case law concerning agency use of adjudica-
tion for policy formulation. It also analyzes policy considerations both for
and against that practice. The Note concludes that the Ninth Circuit's for-
mula for abuse of discretion represents a new, and inadvisable, legal stan-
dard. Although Ford may have been an appropriate case for rulemaking,
the court created an overly broad standard for when rulemaking must be
used. This standard may preclude judicial consideration of policy factors
favoring adjudication when the result of the adjudication is one which
changes existing law and has widespread application. Furthermore, the
Ford standard might deprive agencies of flexibility in deciding how to
proceed in the face of a particular problem, a flexibility long recognized
as critical for an effective administrative process.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Requirements
The formal procedures 8 for rulemaking and adjudication are outlined in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 9 Ford concerned the question
of when one of those procedures, adjudication, could not be used. There
are no clear answers to this question. It is not specifically addressed by
the APA, which only defines the two terms. Furthermore, the APA defi-
nitions that are provided are so broad as to be of only marginal utility.
One commentator, for example, has characterized the APA definition of
rulemaking10 as encompassing "virtually all agency action having future
7. 673F.2dat1OlO.
8. Although not covered by the federal APA, informal procedures also exist for securing compli-
ance to agency policies.
For example, the "lifted eyebrow," backed by a veiled or express threat of prosecution, of
nonrenewal of a license, or of publicity, can be an effective means of declaring and applying a
given policy free from the restraints of judicial review. There is also the private ruling or advi-
sory opinion, which may or may not receive general publicity and may or may not be binding on
the agency. Speeches and press releases are frequently resorted to for the announcement of im-
portant policies or views.
Shapiro. The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy. 78
HARV. L. REV 921,923-24 (1965).
9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976) defines rulemaking as the "agency process for formulating,
amending, or repealing a rule." A rule means:
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, pro-
Vol. 58:633, 1983
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effect." I" A similarly broad definition is accorded adjudication, which is
defined as the agency process for formulating an order, or the "final dis-
position ... [by] an agency in a matter other than rulemaking." 12 In
short, the APA defines adjudication as being that which rulemaking is
not.
APA legislative history also fails to answer the question of when adju-
dication cannot be used. The main historical source, the Attorney Gen-
eral's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act, 13 gives the following
guidelines:
The object of the rulemaking proceeding is the implementation or prescrip-
tion of law or policy for the future, rather than the evaluation of a respon-
dent's past conduct. Typically, the issues relate ... to the policy- making
conclusions to be drawn from the [evidentiary] facts. Conversely, adjudica-
tion is concerned with the determination of past and present rights and lia-
bilities. Normally ... the proceeding is characterized by an accusatory fla-
vor and may result in disciplinary action. 14
These guidelines establish that rulemaking is oriented towards the future,
whereas adjudication is oriented towards the past. The distinction be-
tween the two procedures remains unclear, however, when a particular
problem involves both past conduct and future policy. Ford typifies this
problem. The proceeding had two purposes: (1) to create future policy.
regarding refund of surpluses; and (2) to determine whether Francis Ford,
Inc. should be liable for its past conduct. Neither the APA nor the Attor-
ney General's comments specify what procedure should be used in such a
dual purpose proceeding. Consequently, the answer to this dilemma must
be derived almost solely from case law.
B. Judicially Created Requirements
As a general rule, courts have allowed agencies to use their own discre-
tion in choosing whether to use rulemaking or adjudication.' 5 Courts
have, however, made exceptions to this rule, especially when they per-
cedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganization thereof, prices, facili-
ties, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or prac-
tices bearing on any of the foregoing ....
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1976).
11. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 924.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6)-(7) (1976).
13. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Acr (1947).
14. Id. at 14 (citation omitted).
15. See cases cited supra note 2.
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ceive an abuse of discretion by the agency. 16 Typically, an abuse of dis-
cretion is found when the use of adjudication imposes substantial hard-
ship on one of the parties involved. 17
1. Rule of Deference to Agency Discretion
The United States Supreme Court first announced a policy of judicial
deference to an agency's choice between rulemaking and adjudication in
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery H). 18 Reasoning that the nature of
agency tasks requires flexibility of procedure, the Chenery II Court stated
that "the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individ-
ual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion
of the administrative agency."' 9 The court did note that adjudication is
most appropriate when a case involves unforeseeable situations, when
agency experience with a particular problem is limited, or when a prob-
lem is so unique that a rule would have no future application. 20 Neverthe-
less, the Court refused to create any rigid requirements regarding when
general rules should be promulgated, as that "would make the adminis-
trative process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the spe-
cialized problems which arise.' 21
The Court's deference to agency discretion was not wholly without
limits. Although it refused to specify situations in which rulemaking must
be used, the Court did express a preference for rulemaking procedures,
stating that "[t]he function of filling in the interstices of the [Public Util-
ity Holding Company] Act should be performed, as much as possible,
through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the
future.' '22
Despite these qualifications, Chenery II has generally been interpreted
as permitting agencies to make new law through adjudication. 23 Agencies
16. See infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
18. 332 U.S. 194 (1947). Chenery 11 involved an attempt by the defendant corporation to have
the SEC adopt an order permitting the corporation's management to purchase its corporate stock
during reorganization under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z
(1976). The SEC denied the order, using an adjudicative process. The Supreme Court upheld the
Commission's choice of adjudication, as the Commission had stated that it might have allowed the
order under a different set of facts.
19. Id. at 203.
20. Id. at 202-03.
21. Id. at 202.
22. Id.




therefore have frequently used adjudicatory proceedings to formulate pol-
icies, a practice widely criticized for its often unfair effects. 24
2. Limits on Agency Discretion
Perhaps in response to this criticism, courts have created judicial limits
on an agency's discretion to use adjudication. 25 The United States Su-
preme Court announced one of the most important limits on agency dis-
cretion in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. 26 Although the Court upheld the
agency's use of adjudication in Bell Aerospace, it stated that "there may
be situations where the Board's reliance on adjudication would amount to
an abuse of discretion.' '27 According to the Bell Aerospace Court, an
abuse of discretion occurs when an adjudication results in substantial
hardship to the parties involved. 28
Substantial hardship may result if a party has relied upon published
rules or policies that are subsequently changed by adjudication. This can
happen not only when the change occurs in the case at bar, but also when
the change occurred in a prior adjudication of which the party had no
notice. Ruangswang v. Immigration and Naturalization Service29 illus-
trates this latter situation. In a prior adjudication the Immigration and Na-
turalization Service had added a new requirement for changing alien sta-
tus. The new requirement would have resulted in a denial of
Ruangswang's request for a change of alien status even though he had
complied with other published requirements. It would also have resulted
in Ruangswang's deportation. Because Ruangswang had no notice of the
adjudicatory requirement, and because that lack of notice resulted in a
24. See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS. supra note 23; Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc Approach-Which
Should it Be?, 22 LAW & CoNTEMp. PROBS. 658 (1957); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of
the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 728 (1961); Shapiro, supra note 8.
25. One such limitation was provided by the Court in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S.
759 (1969), in which the Court held that agencies may not announce a rule in an adjudication without
applying it in the particular case. In Wyman-Gordon, the NLRB had attempted to apply a rule an-
nounced prospectively in a prior adjudication, Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236
(1966). The Wyman-Gordon court found the Excelsior rule to be invalid because it had not been
applied in the Excelsior case. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the NLRB could formulate the same
rule in Wyman-Gordon, and that the newly stated rule was valid so long as it applied to the Wyman-
Gordon Corporation.
26. 416U.S. 267(1974).
27. Id. at 294.
28. The Bell Aerospace Court provided specific examples of when adjudicatory results would
yield a finding of abuse of agency discretion. These examples included imposing liability for past
actions taken in good faith reliance on agency pronouncements, imposing significant fines or dam-
ages for conduct seemingly lawful when engaged in, and imposing liability when application of a
new and different rule would cause substantial adverse consequences because of a party's reliance
upon prior agency decisions. Id. at 295.
29. 591 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1978).
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substantial adverse effect---deportation-the court ruled that application
of the requirement was an abuse of agency discretion. 30
Courts have also found that agencies have abused their discretion when
they create rules through adjudication that have substantial impact on the
public as well as the party involved. 31 Thus, in Texaco, Inc. v. Federal
Power Commission,32 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) had improperly circumvented rule-
making procedures by using adjudication to impose a compound interest
rate on gas companies. The court refused to enforce the FPC's order be-
cause the amount of money involved was potentially large and therefore
significant, and because the higher utility rates would affect the public. 33
3. Additional Factors
Several other factors may influence a court in finding an abuse of
agency discretion. One is that the adjudicatory rule would retroactively
impose a penalty on a party when no rule had previously governed the
conduct at issue.34 Another is the lack of non-party participation when
rules are made in an adjudication. 35 Courts have also suggested that hard-
ship sufficient to amount to an abuse of discretion might occur if an
agency formulated an adjudicative rule requiring one party to cease a
practice while permitting a competitor to continue to engage in the prac-
tice without sanction. 36 To permit the agency to proceed against one vio-
30. Id. at 44. See also Hirunpidok v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 641 F.2d 778, 780
(9th Cir. 1981) (application of subsequent judicially created job-opportunity expansion requirement
to alien investor improper when petition met requirements of regulation in effect at time of applica-
tion); Bahat v. Sureck, 637 F.2d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1981) (investment requirement imposed by
Immigration and Naturalization Service Board of Appeals could not be applied to petitioner because
he had not had adequate notice of requirement at time of application); Patel v. Immigration and
Naturalization Serv., 638 F.2d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 1981) (judicially created job expansion require-
ment improperly implied to alien seeking investor exemption because alien received "confusing sig-
nals" from Immigration and Naturalization Service).
31. Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 743 (3rd Cir. 1969). See also Lewis-
Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (abuse of discretion to issue directive
without publication and notice when directive makes it more difficult for aliens to find jobs and for
employers to fill vacancies); Nat'l Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 96
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (abuse of agency discretion not to use formal rulemaking when establishing proce-
dure for reparations to shippers from carriers because form and scope of procedure are important to
the industry and the public), affdmem., 393 U.S. 16 (1968).
32. Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969).
33. Id. at743.
34. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (may be abuse of discretion to
use adjudication where fines or damages involved).
35. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
36. See FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 251 (1967) (FTC "does not have unbri-
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lator among many would place that party at a severe competitive disad-
vantage.
II. THE FORD COURT'S REASONING
On February 10, 1976, the FTC issued nine complaints37 against auto-
mobile dealers, manufacturers, and financers for violating section 5 of the
FTC Act. 38 The FTC claimed that these companies had violated section 5
by improperly calculating the reasonable expenses deductible from any
surplus due the defaulting consumer upon resale of a repossessed car. 39
The subsequent administrative adjudication involved only defendant
Francis Ford, Inc., as all other defendants had settled with the Commis-
sion. 40 At the adjudication, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found
that due to its improper calculation of reasonable expenses, Francis Ford
died power to institute proceedings which will arbitrarily destroy one of many law violators in an
industry"). But see Johnson Prod. Co. v. FTC, 549 F.2d 35, 41 (7th Cir. 1977) (FTC has discretion-
ary power to enter a cease and desist order "against one firm that is practicing an industry-wide
illegal trade practice") (quoting L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, 442 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1971)).
37. In addition to the complaint against Francis Ford, complaints were issued against Ford Motor
Co., the Ford Motor Credit Co., General Motors Corp., General Motors Acceptance Corp., Chuck
Olson Chevrolet, Chrysler Motors Co., Chrysler Motors Credit Corp., and Aurora Chrysler Plym-
outh. Brief for Respondent at 6-7, Ford Motor Co. v. FrC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981).
38. See supra note 4.
39. When a consumer purchases an automobile on credit, he or she normally executes a monthly
installment contract granting the creditor a security interest in the vehicle as protection against non-
payment. Then, if the customer defaults on his or her monthly payments, the creditor repossesses the
automobile and resells it, either wholesale or retail. Under the provisions of U.C.C. § 9-504, any
surpluses realized upon resale, less reasonable expenses, must be refunded to the defaulter.
One of the principal substantive issues presented to the court was whether it should uphold that part
of the Commission's order establishing what were "reasonable expenses" deductible from resale
proceeds under U.C.C. § 9-504. Prior to the FTC order issued against Francis Ford, dealers typically
interpreted reasonable expenses as including overhead costs as well as direct out-of-pocket expenses.
Overhead costs are the general, continuing costs of a business, such as rent, taxes, utility payments
and fixed wages. As such, they are incurred regardless of whether a vehicle is repossessed. The FTC
order prohibited including overhead as a deductible reasonable expense. Instead, reasonable expenses
included only: (1) costs of repossession, towing, etc.; (2) court costs, registration, title fees, and
inspection fees; (3) amounts paid to others for storage; (4) labor and parts for reconditioning the
repossessed vehicle; (5) sales commissions to the sales person if the vehicle was resold at retail; (6)
advertising costs directly related to the vehicle; (7) auction expenses if the vehicle was disposed of
through an auction; (8) telephone and postage costs related to the vehicle; and (9) amounts paid to the
financing institution. Ford Motor Co., 94 F.T.C. 564, 636-38 (1979), vacated, Ford Motor Co. v.
FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982).
40. The other defendants consented both to desist from the challenged practices and to repay
more than $2.5 million in surpluses to over 10,000 persons whose vehicles had previously been
repossessed. The figures pertaining to the amount and numbers of refunds are from the FTC's Petition
for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 4, Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d'1008
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
The consent order is printed at 45 Fed. Reg. 14,870-80 (1980).
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had failed to make refunds as required by U.C.C. section 9-504. 4 1 The
ALJ concluded that Francis Ford had thereby violated section 5 of the
FTC Act by engaging in an unfair or deceptive act or practice. 42
Francis Ford appealed the Commission's decision to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. 43 Although several issues were argued on appeal,44 the
court addressed only one question: "whether the FTC should have pro-
ceeded by rulemaking ... rather than by adjudication." 45 Noting that the
FTC order would have widespread effect, 46 and would change existing
interpretations of U.C.C. section 9-504, 47 the Ford court answered the
question affirmatively. Consequently, the court vacated the order.
Unlike prior abuse of discretion cases which had focused on the pres-
ence of substantial hardship, 48 the Ford court based its finding of abuse of
discretion on two factors: (1) that the rule established by the FTC would
have widespread application; and (2) that the rule would change existing
law. 49 In adopting these two factors, the Ford court relied heavily on a
41. Ford Motor Co., 94 F.T.C. 564, 588-94, affd by the Commission, 94 F.T.C. 564, 607, 616
(1979), vacated, Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
358 (1982).
42. Id. at 594-96. See supra note 4 (text of § 5). Accordingly, Francis Ford was ordered to cease
its refund calculation methods and to calculate and repay all future surpluses in accordance with
procedures specified by the FTC. Id. at 636-47. Whether a surplus existed was to be determined by
subtracting the sum of the debtor's contract balance plus reasonable expenses from the actual pro-
ceeds gained upon resale of a repossessed automobile. Id. For an itemization of what the FTC consid-
ered to be reasonable expenses, see supra note 39.
Francis Ford was also ordered to notify customers whose automobiles had been repossessed after
issuance of the FTC complaint that they may be due a refund. Francis Ford was not ordered to pay
these refunds, however, as the Commission felt that it lacked power to issue such an order.
The Commission reasoned that an order to repay "unlawfully witheld" past surpluses would con-
flict with Heater v. FTC, 503 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1974). 94 F.T.C. at 622-23. The Heater court held
that the Commission lacked authority to order restitution for violations of law committed prior to the
entry of a cease and desist order. After Heater, Congress amended the FTC Act to permit restitution
after a cease and desist order by means of a district court proceeding in which "the Commission
satisfies the court that the act or practice to which the cease and desist order relates is one which a
reasonable man would have known under the circumstances was dishonest or fraudulent." Magnu-
son-Moss Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 206(a), 88 Stat. 2201-02 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §
57b(a)(2) (1976)). Accordingly, the Commission expressly reserved its right in Ford to bring a §
57b(a)(2) action against Francis Ford. 94 F.T.C. at 624 n. 19.
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (granting any person required by an FTC order to "cease and desist
from any method of competition or act or practice" the right to obtain a review of such order in a
United States court of appeals).
44. Brief for Respondent at 1-2; Brief for Petitioner at 1-2; Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d
1008 (1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982).
45. 673 F.2d at 1009.
46. The Ford court reasoned that the rule of the Ford adjudication would have widespread effect
because credit practices similar to those of Francis Ford are widespread in the car dealership industry
and because U.C.C. § 9-504 has been enacted into law in 49 states. Id. at 1010.
47. Id. at 1009-10.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 25-32.
49. 673 F.2dat 1009-10.
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previous Ninth Circuit decision, Patel v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,50 which it characterized as establishing a general standard speci-
fying when an agency's reliance on adjudication is impermissible. Ac-
cording to the Ford court, the thrust of Patel was that "agencies can pro-
ceed by adjudication to enforce discrete violations of existing laws where
the effective scope of the rule's impact will be relatively small; but an
agency must proceed by rulemaking if it seeks to change the law and es-
tablish rules of widespread application." ' 5 1 Therefore, under Patel,
whether adjudication is an abuse of agency discretion depends upon
"whether [the] adjudication changes existing law and has widespread ap-
plication. "52 The court found both of these elements present in the FTC's
proceeding against Ford.
The Ford court found that the FTC's interpretation of U.C.C. section
9-504 changed existing law, because the Commission had cited no cases
that had similarly interpreted the statute. 53 The court also reasoned that
because the provision is part of the law in forty-nine states, the adjudica-
tion against Ford would have widespread effect by creating "a national
interpretation of U.C.C. section 9-504.''54
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FORD COURT'S REASONING
The decision handed down in Ford severely limits agencies' freedom
of choice to decide whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication.
Some limitation on this freedom is perhaps desirable for, as the abuse of
discretion cases illustrate, 55 agencies do not always exercise their discre-
tion wisely. The court's decision in Ford, however, is unsupported by
prior case law, is unnecessary to achieve policy objectives, and adopts a
rule that is overly broad. 56
50. 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980).
51. 673 F.2d at 1009.
52. Id. at 1010.
53. Id.
54. Id. The practices found unlawful in Ford are widespread in the automobile dealership indus-
try. Id. at 1008-10. It should be noted, however, that the FTC believes Francis Ford's practices are
particularly violative of the FTC Act and U.C.C. § 9-504. Brief for Respondent at 12-15.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
56. Although Ford does not fit within any of the prior rationales advanced by courts for finding
an abuse of discretion, it does not necessarily follow that the FTC should have used adjudication. As
the Supreme Court stated in Chenery II, adjudication is properly used when a case involves unfore-
seeable situations, limited agency experience, or a unique problem. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 202-03 (1947). Unlike other cases that upheld use of adjudication over arguments of impropri-
ety, such as NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), and SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194 (1947), Ford did not involve unique facts. Unlike BellAerospace, for example, it cannot be
said of Ford that "[i]t is doubtful whether any generalized standard could be framed which would
have more than marginal utility." 416 U.S. at 294. Indeed, the case arose from complaints issued to
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A. Prior Case Law on Abuse ofAgency Discretion
I. Patel v. Immigration and Naturalization Service
The Ford court cited only one case, Patel v. Immigration and Natural-
ization Service,57 as precedent for its abuse of discretion standards. Patel,
however, is fully distinguishable from Ford. Patel, like Ruangswang v.
immigration and Naturalization Service, 58 turned on a finding of extreme
hardship due to reliance on a prior rule. Like Ruangswang, Patel in-
volved denial of a change in status to an alien on the basis of a require-
ment added in a previous adjudication. The court concluded that applica-
tion of the requirement to Patel would improperly circumvent rulemaking
procedures. 59 More importantly, the court found that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service had sent aliens "confusing signals" about the
change in status requirements, and therefore had abused its discretion in
applying the new requirement to Patel. 60 This finding was clearly influ-
enced by the harsh result of applying the rule in question to Patel-depor-
nine parties encompassing most of the American automobile industry and its financing subsidiaries.
See supra note 37; Brief for Respondent at 6-7.
Nor did the FTC in Ford need to preserve its freedom to develop a rule on a case-by-case basis due
to lack of experience with the particular problem. The "Synopsis of Determinations," see infra note
73. issued in the Ford adjudication was anything but tentative. Rather, it appeared to be a final
statement on the subject of calculating refunds.
Finally, the case did not involve unforeseeable problems to which the Commission had to respond
quickly, or for which the agency lacked expertise. The FTC's longstanding concern with this problem
is apparent from a prior proposed rule concerning credit practices. 40 Fed. Reg. 16,347 (1975).
Unlike the Ford adjudication, which concerned a previously uninterpreted section of the U.C.C., this
proposed rule concerned credit practices expressly permitted by the laws of many states but allegedly
harmful to consumers. FTC Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 13, Ford
Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982) (copy on file
with the Washington Law Review). One aspect of that proceeding involved deficiencies in reposses-
sion cases-an area closely related to repossession surpluses. Id. The court found that this rulemak-
ing proceeding was significant because it indicated the propriety of rulemaking for this type of case.
673 F.2d at 1010.
Thus. Ford did not involve a situation in which adjudication was more appropriate than rulemak-
ing. That does not mean, however, that the agency abused its discretion by using adjudication. As the
Supreme Court first stated in 1947, "the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by
individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
agency. " SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). This statement of the Supreme Court
has been quoted innumerable times. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 648 (5th Cir.
1979); NLRB v. Q-T Shoe Mfg. Co., 409 F.2d 1247, 1252 (3rd Cir. 1969); Logansport Broadcasting
Corp. v. United States, 210 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1954). It follows that even though the FTC's
choice of adjudication in this case might have been unwise, it was a choice the Commission was free
to make.
57. 638 F.2d 1199(9th Cir. 1980).
58. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
59. 638 F.2d at 1203-04.
60. Id. at 1205.
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tation. 61 Unlike Patel, Ford did not involve the presence of substantial
hardship. Ford was the FTC's first statement of how it believed U.C.C.
section 9-504 applied to the deduction of reasonable expenses from sur-
plus refunds. 62 Thus, Francis Ford had not relied on prior agency policy
to its detriment.
2. Other Case Law
The Ford case also does not involve any of the situations in which
courts have previously found adjudication to be an abuse of agency dis-
cretion. One such situation is when a party has acted in reliance on a pre-
existing agency policy. 63 To change that policy in an adjudication and
then hold the party liable for complying with the old policy rather than the
unannounced new one is clearly unfair. Ford did not involve this type of
unfairness.
Another situation in which courts have found an abuse of discretion is
when an adjudicatory rule will have a substantial impact on both the regu-
lated entity and the public. 64 These factors were also not present in Ford.
Although the order could have substantial impact on the industry by re-
quiring dealers to calculate and refund surpluses, it would not signifi-
cantly affect the public. Because repossession is relatively infrequent, 65
the total cost to dealers of calculating and refunding surpluses should not
result in substantial price increases for consumers.
Therefore, prior case law does not support the Ford court's ruling that
an abuse of agency discretion exists when an adjudication changes exist-
ing law and has widespread application. The case cited by the court as the
source of its standards is easily distinguished. Moreover, the Ford case
did not involve any of the primary reasons given by courts for preferring
61. The court noted that the "hardship Patel has experienced as a result of his failure to comply
with the job-creation criterion is great." Id. at 1205. It then quoted from Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 154 (1945), regarding deportation: "deportation ... visits a great hardship on the individual
.... That deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious one-cannot be doubted. Meticulous
care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential
standards of fairness." 638 F.2d at 1205.
62. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Automobile Dealers Association in Support of Opposition
to Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc at 12, Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673
F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Amicus
Curiae NADA] (copy on file with the Washington Law Review); see 673 F.2d at 1010.
63. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
65. For example, during 1974-75 the FTC found that the total money that should have been
refunded by Francis Ford totalled $15,000. Ford Motor Co., 94 F.T.C. 564, 618 (1979), vacated,
Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982). This
amount is of little significance when compared with Francis Ford's total revenues of $26,000,000,
and profits of approximately $131,440, for the same period. Id. at 566.
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rulemaking over adjudication: reliance, substantial impact on both the
public and the party, hardship resulting from retroactivity, lack of non-
party participation, and anti-competitive effect. Thus, the test established
by the Ford court clearly constitutes a new legal standard.
B. Policy Concerns
Finally, the Ford case does not invoke any of the policy concerns that
courts and commentators have suggested would make adjudication an
abuse of discretion. One important policy concern is the retroactive effect
of adjudication. 66 Retroactivity may cause substantial hardship for a party
if it results in significant penalties being imposed. 67 Such punitive retro-
activity was not present in Ford. The only retroactive portion of the FTC
order required Francis Ford to notify those customers whose automobiles
it had repossessed after issuance of the complaint that they may be due a
refund. 68 Presumably, the FTC required this notice so that the customers
could pursue private actions against Francis Ford. Because the FTC
lacked power to order restitution for past acts, however, 69 it did not im-
pose damages or require a retroactive refund. 70
Another important policy concern is the anti-competitive effect of or-
dering a party to cease a practice in which its competitors remain free to
engage. 71 This concern, like the others, does not apply to Ford. Not only
have the three major United States automobile manufacturers ordered
their dealers to comply with the FTC consent order, 72 but the FTC has
sought to notify all dealers of the new requirements through publication
of a "Synopsis of Determinations," which was attached to the FTC Ford
order. 73 The FTC thus ordered Francis Ford to comply with a refund tech-
nique similar to that which all dealers will have to follow in the future. 74
66. Retroactive application is required in an adjudication by NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394
U.S. 759 (1969). See supra note 25.
67. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (no abuse where adverse
consequences are not substantial, as when fines or damages are not involved); SEC v. Chenery Corp..
332 U.S. 194. 203 (1947) (an action's retroactive effect not necessarily fatal to its validity since all
cases of first impression have retroactive effect).
68. See supra note 42.
69. Id.
70. Under 15 U.S.C. § 57b(a)(2) (1976), such penalties can be imposed in FTC proceedings only
after a finding by the district court that the act or practice to which the cease and desist order related
was one that a reasonable person would have known was dishonest or fraudulent.
71. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
73. The Synopsis was attached under the authority of 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (1976). and pro-
vides:
It is unfair and unlawful under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45)
for a party to engage in the following practices:
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Yet another important policy concern is that adjudication does not af-
ford interested non-parties notice of, and an opportunity to comment on,
the proposed rule prior to its adoption. 75 By limiting effective participa-
(A) Failing to account for and pay a defaulting customer within a reasonable time after repos-
session and resale (or lease) of the collateral, any surplus to which the customer is entitled under
state law, and which the party is obliged to pay the customer under state law.
(B) Failing to credit to the defaulting customer, for purposes of determining any surplus or
deficiency:
1. The full amount of unearned finance charges, including the proportionate shares of the
dealer and the financing institution.
2. The full amount of any unearned insurance premiums, including but not limited to the
dealer's (sales commission) share of premiums attributable to the remaining term of the insur-
ance.
3. The full amount of proceeds received from or credited by an insurance firm or other source
as compensation for damage to the repossessed collateral, except where such proceeds are offset
by actual repair of that damage.
4. The full amount of proceeds realized upon an actual sale (or lease) of the repossessed
collateral to an independent third party, in good faith, for the best possible price.
5. The underallowance realized on any property taken in trade upon the sale (or lease) of the
repossessed collateral; i.e., the amount by which the established wholesale value of such trade-
in property exceeds the trade-in allowance given therefor.
(C) Failing to exclude, for purposes of calculating the amount of any surplus or deficiency:
1. All amounts for repair and reconditioning above and beyond the direct (out-of-pocket)
expense incurred by a secured party in or for performance of such repair or reconditioning of the
particular repossessed collateral in preparing it for sale (or lease).
2. All amounts paid upon the sale (or lease) of the repossessed collateral as commissions for
the sale of insurance and financing, and all amounts paid to supervisorial and administrative/
support personnel without regard to whether they participated directly in the process of promot-
ing that particular sale (or lease).
3. All amounts for advertising other than a proportionate share of expenditures for advertise-
ments which specifically mention the particular collateral.
4. All indirect or fixed expenses (overhead), including but not limited to costs of real prop-
erty, rent, depreciation, capital, supervision, administration, insurance and other expenses
which are not directly increased as a result of the repossession, storing, reconditioning or resell-
ing (or leasing) of the particular collateral.
5. All costs and expenses other than unreimbursed out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred as
a direct result of the repossession, storing or sale (or lease) of the particular collateral, or of
preparing it for such sale or lease.
6. Any amount of overallowance greater than the lawful excess of trade-in allowance given
upon the sale (or lease) of the repossessed collateral, over the established wholesale value of
property taken in trade thereon.
(D) Taking any action to obtain or to attempt to obtain or bring about a waiver of a customer's
right to a refund of surplus, except in the precise manner and under the precise circumstances
contemplated by the applicable state law version of Section 9-505 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Under Section 9-505 a waiver of a customer's right to a surplus may not be sought unless
the secured party intends to retain the collateral for its own use for the immediate future rather
than to resell the collateral in the ordinary course of business.
Ford Motor Co., 94 F.T.C. 564, 634-35 (1979), vacated, Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 1008
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982).
74. The Ford court viewed the Synopsis as evidence of the Commission's intent to use the Ford
adjudication as a rule with general application. 673 F.2d at 1010.
75. See, e.g., 2 K. DAVIS, supra note 23, at 119. Although not cited as a determinative factor by
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tion by broad segments of the public, adjudication may prevent an agency
from hearing the full range of divergent interests represented by the gen-
eral public. This reasoning, however, overlooks common agency prac-
tices for permitting public participation in adjudications. These practices
range from accepting informal statements or amicus briefs to allowing
interested persons full intervention as parties.76 Moreover, it is question-
able whether comments by the general public can meaningfully affect the
creation of administrative policy. The very facet of rulemaking that per-
mits broad public participation may serve to keep the depth of public in-
volvement minimal and the treatment of specific, complex issues shal-
low. 77 Adjudication, on the other hand, can arguably provide an
opportunity for more meaningful involvement by non-parties.78
Meaningful outside involvement did occur in Ford. The National Au-
tomobile Dealers Association (NADA), which represents approximately
20,000 automobile dealers, 79 participated vigorously in the Ford pro-
ceedings. 80 It is likely that the FTC afforded significantly more weight to
NADA's arguments than it would have to the comments of individual
dealers. Furthermore, in this case all the parties likely to appear in a rule-
making proceeding on repossession surpluses have appeared in the adju-
dication proceeding.81
C. The Ford Test
The Ford case did not involve any of the major legal or policy concerns
that courts and commentators have advanced as reasons for finding that
adjudication is an abuse of discretion. Perhaps in recognition of this, the
Ford court based its decision on two factors never before found to consti-
tute an abuse of discretion: (1) that the rule established by the FTC would
have widespread application; and (2) that the rule changed existing law.
the Ford court, lack of notice was mentioned as a reason why adjudication was inappropriate in this
case. 673 F.2d at 1010.
76. See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adju.
dication and Administrative Procedural Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 515 (1970).
77. Id. at 516.
78. Id.
79. Brief for Amicus Curiae NADA, supra note 62, at 3.
80. It is a matter of dispute between the parties whether NADA was granted status as a full
intervenor in the hearing. The AU granted NADA status as an intervenor with full party rights on
issues relating to any remedy to be imposed, but denied it permission to intervene on liability issues.
Brief for Respondent at 7-8, 59-60. NADA, Francis Ford and the court interpreted this limitation as
a denial of full intervention. 673 F.2d at 1009; Brief for Amicus Curiae NADA, supra note 62, at 3;
Brief of Francis Ford, Inc. in Opposition to Petition for Rehearing at 4, Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673
F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 358 (1982) (copy on file with the Washington
Law Review).




The first factor, the widespread application rationale, has been rejected
by other courts as a sufficient reason to find an abuse of discretion. In
British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,82 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit stated: "That the result of the Board's adjudica-
tion will have wide-ranging application in the future, is, if not irrelevant,
certainly not dispositive of the question of whether the agency abused its
discretion in opting for adjudication rather than rulemaking. "83 Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit had previously rejected the widespread application ra-
tionale. In NLRB v. St. Francis Hospital,8 4 the Ninth Circuit rejected the
argument that because the Board's adjudicatory decision was to be gener-
ally applied, it was tantamount to a rule, and therefore required rulemak-
ing procedures.8 5
The other factor relied on by the Ford court, the change in existing law
rationale, has also been generally rejected as a reason to find an abuse of
discretion. 86 A leading commentator on administrative procedure has
stated that "[t]he simple answer to the question whether an agency may
make new law through adjudication, instead of using its rulemaking
power, is yes. ',87 Of course, if it is shown that the party relied on a prior
statement of the law, fairness may dictate a contrary answer. 88 But, as
shown above, no such reliance existed in Ford as no prior law existed.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
an abuse of agency discretion because an FTC adjudication changed ex-
isting law and had widespread application. The court's decision did not
follow judicial precedent or consider appropriate policy factors. The stan-
dards for abuse of discretion established by the Ford court are overly
broad and may severely interfere with needed agency flexibility. Applica-
tion of the standard may preclude agency and judicial consideration of
policy factors favoring adjudication in future cases. 89 Unfortunately,
82. 584 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
83. Id. at 994. See also Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (the choice to
proceed by rulemaking or adjudication is primarily one for the agency regardless of whether the
decision may affect agency policy and have general prospective application), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
890(1976).
84. 601 F.2d 404(9th Cir. 1979).
85. Id. at414.
86. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (NLRB not precluded from an-
nouncing new principles in adjudication); SEC v. Chenery Corp, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (case-by-
case approach retains a definite place in evolution of statutory standards).
87. 2 K. DAvis. supra note 23, at 118-19.
88. See supra notes 29-30, 66-67 and accompanying text.
89. The Ninth Circuit already appears to have limited Ford. In Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
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these new standards have survived agency attack. Thus, the new rule will
govern agency behavior until it becomes so riddled with exceptions that,
like all broad inflexible rules, it ceases to have legal effect.
Barbara Himes Schuknecht
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FTC. 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982), inconsistent agency behavior, such as adjudicative standards at
variance with standards promulgated by rule, was noted as a significant factor in Ford. Id. at 1329 &
n. 13. Although this is not an accurate characterization of Ford. see supra note 56, Montgomery Ward
indicates that the Ford rule may already be perceived by the court as being overly broad.
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